On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom held a referendum in which 51.9% of voters supported leaving the European Union. This referendum only had two options: leave or stay.

GV924

Public Policy

Case Study 

PART 1: (Mark 60%)

On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom held a referendum in which 51.9% of voters supported leaving the European Union. This referendum only had two options: leave or stay. Many people afterwards demanded a new vote arguing that voting over merely two options gives an imperfect picture of citizens’ preferences.

Let us consider a hypothetical alternative referendum with three options: a hard Brexit (H), a soft Brexit (S), and remaining (R).Assume that a poll company elicited the preferences of British voters over these alternatives. Answers of those with a clear preference (those who did not answer “would not vote” or “do not know” are illustrated in the table below.

(a)  Let us assume that only people with a clear preference vote. Which alternative would win using the following voting rules?

i.Borda system

ii.Dowdall system—assign weights to the choices such that the first choice weights twice as much as the second, and three times as much as the third.

•(b)  The full preference list after pressuring everyone to pick their choice is shown in the table below. Assume that these preferences reflect British voters’ true preferences and that the voters vote sincerely.

i. Is there a Condorcet winner?

ii. In an instant run-off system, voters rank their choices on a single ballot. If there is a first choice that exceeds 50% support, it is implemented. Otherwise, the least popular first choice is eliminated, and voters who ranked that first are added to one of the remaining options based on their second choices. Which policy would win the referendum with this voting system?

PART 2: (Mark 40%)

Consider the following two approaches to the study of public policy:

Model A: Legislative scholars recognize that legislative output is affected by the legislature’s institutional design. Let us assume that the goals are to avoid chaos and to enhance welfare. Toward these goals there are many variations. Strong committees (Shepsle and Weingast 1987), strong ruling parties (Cox and McCubbins 2004), institutions fostering legislative exchange (Weingast and Marshall 1988) and a strong agenda setter (Dahm and Glazer 2015) all can contribute to the interests a legislature’s members (see also Krehbiel 2004).

Model B: The relationship between executives and domestic groups can also be seen as an ongoing set of bargains between principals and agents. Their relative bargaining power determines the degree of autonomy or "agency slack" enjoyed by the executive with respect to her preferred policies. Domestic constituents impose constraints on executives, who need to maintain sufficient support to adopt and sustain policies. Where such constraints are tight, the executive has little control over the outcome. Where constraints are loose, the executive can "shirk" tasks assigned by societal groups and can pursue policies closer to her own ideal.

i. In your own words, explain which of the above models (A or B) is a better model of public policy (defined as who gets what, when and how much)? Explain your argument using at least two texts from the course.

ii. Both of the above models (A&B) ignore the role of outside foreign actors. Why (or why not) is this a problem? Explain your argument and include at least three references from the text Knill and Tosun (2020), chapters 10 ("Public Policies beyond the Nation States") and 11 ("Policy Change and Policy Convergence”) which is on your reading list.