Sample Answer (Preview)
The following is a partial sample answer showing the approach, structure and referencing expected for this brief. It covers approximately 30% of the full 3,000-word assignment.
Part A: The UAE–United Kingdom Partnership: Trends, Wealth, Culture and Identity
1. Introduction
In 2025, trade in goods and services between the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates reached £25.0 billion, making the UAE one of the UK’s most important partners outside Europe and North America (Department for Business and Trade, 2026a). The relationship, rooted in the era of British treaty relations with the Trucial States before the federation was formed in 1971, has evolved from a security-centred connection into a multidimensional partnership spanning trade, sovereign investment, education, energy transition and culture. In this essay, an alliance is understood as a formal or informal arrangement through which states pursue shared strategic interests, while a partnership denotes sustained co-operation for mutual economic and social benefit. Globalisation refers to the intensifying cross-border flows of capital, goods, people and ideas. It is argued that the UAE–UK partnership has been reshaped by the Emirati drive for economic diversification and by the UK’s search for new markets and investment, producing substantial mutual gains while raising important questions about the distribution of wealth, cultural identity and inequality.
2. Economic Trends and the Changing Landscape
The most significant trend in the partnership is its shift from hydrocarbons towards investment, services and technology. For much of the twentieth century, the UAE’s economic ties with the West were defined by oil exports, a pattern that rentier state theory associates with governments funded by external rents rather than domestic production (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987). Successive diversification plans have altered this profile: non-oil activities accounted for 75.5 per cent of UAE GDP in 2024, with trade, manufacturing and financial services the largest contributors (WAM, 2025). Comparative research nevertheless cautions that diversification across the Gulf has historically been slower than official strategies suggest, largely because secure public-sector employment and abundant low-wage migrant labour weaken incentives for private enterprise and export production (Hvidt, 2013; Callen et al., 2014). The UAE is widely regarded as the regional frontrunner, and this progress has directly shaped its engagement with the UK.
The changing landscape is most visible in investment. The UAE–UK Sovereign Investment Partnership, signed in March 2021 between the UK Office for Investment and Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Investment Company, was expanded in September 2021 into a £10 billion commitment across technology, infrastructure, energy transition and life sciences (Department for International Trade, 2021). This marks a qualitative change: Gulf capital now flows into British strategic sectors, rather than British firms simply supplying goods to the Gulf. At the multilateral level, the conclusion of UK–Gulf Cooperation Council free trade negotiations in May 2026 promises lower tariffs, faster customs clearance and new commitments on data flows (Department for Business and Trade, 2026b). Trade data also reveal volatility, however: bilateral trade fell to £13.3 billion in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic before recovering to £25.0 billion in 2025 (Department for Business and Trade, 2026a). The partnership therefore appears resilient but remains exposed to global shocks, including energy-price swings and regional insecurity. Overall, the economic relationship has moved from oil dependency towards reciprocal, investment-led interdependence.
3. Wealth and Its Effects
The UAE’s national wealth originates primarily from hydrocarbon revenues, a large share of which has been channelled into sovereign wealth funds such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Mubadala. Gray (2011) characterises the contemporary Gulf states as examples of ‘late rentierism’, in which governments still depend on resource rents but deploy them more strategically by investing abroad, building globally competitive industries and responding actively to globalisation. Emirati investment in the UK illustrates this model: capital supports British infrastructure, property and technology firms, while generating returns that diversify the UAE’s income away from oil. For the UK, inward investment provides finance for regeneration and job creation; for the UAE, it secures access to expertise, technology and prestigious assets that strengthen its global position.
The social effects of this wealth are, however, uneven. Within the UAE, rent distribution has historically funded generous public employment, housing and welfare for citizens, contributing to high living standards among Emiratis (Hvidt, 2013). Yet citizens form a minority of the resident population, and the large expatriate workforce, much of it employed in construction and services, does not share equally in these benefits (Davidson, 2008). This segmented labour market, which Callen et al. (2014) identify as a structural barrier to private-sector development, means that aggregate wealth indicators overstate how evenly prosperity is distributed…
Part B: Key Factors Influencing the Development of Rwanda
1. Introduction
Since 2000, Rwanda’s GDP has risen five-fold, while the national poverty rate fell from an estimated 39.8 per cent in 2016/17 to 27.4 per cent in 2023/24 (NISR, 2025). Development is understood here not merely as rising income but, following Sen (1999), as the expansion of the substantive freedoms that people enjoy, including health, education and political participation. Institutional theory adds that inclusive political and economic institutions are decisive in explaining why some nations prosper while others stagnate (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). This report examines how political, social, environmental, economic and educational factors interact to shape Rwanda’s development, and argues that state-led stability and investment have driven rapid growth, although job creation, human capital and climate vulnerability remain binding constraints (World Bank, 2026)…
[End of preview] The remaining sections of Part A (culture, identity, poverty and its effects; conclusion) and Part B (political, social, environmental, economic and educational factors; synthesis; conclusion and recommendations) are included in the full solution, which is available on order.
References
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
Beblawi, H. and Luciani, G. (eds) (1987) The Rentier State. London: Croom Helm.
Callen, T., Cherif, R., Hasanov, F., Hegazy, A. and Khandelwal, P. (2014) Economic Diversification in the GCC: Past, Present, and Future. IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/14/12. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2014/sdn1412.pdf (Accessed: 9 November 2026).
Davidson, C.M. (2008) Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success. London: Hurst & Company.
Department for Business and Trade (2026a) Exporting from the UK to United Arab Emirates: trade statistics. Available at: https://www.business.gov.uk/export-from-uk/markets/united-arab-emirates/ (Accessed: 9 November 2026).
Department for Business and Trade (2026b) UK and Gulf strike historic multi-billion-pound trade deal. GOV.UK, 20 May. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-gulf-strike-historic-multi-billion-pound-trade-deal (Accessed: 9 November 2026).
Department for International Trade (2021) UAE to invest £10 billion in priority UK industries. GOV.UK, 16 September. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uae-to-invest-10-billion-in-priority-uk-industries (Accessed: 9 November 2026).
Gray, M. (2011) A Theory of ‘Late Rentierism’ in the Arab States of the Gulf. CIRS Occasional Paper No. 7. Doha: Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Available at: https://repository.digital.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/558291 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).
Hvidt, M. (2013) Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Record and Future Trends. Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, Research Paper 27. London: London School of Economics and Political Science. Available at: https://researchonline.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/55252/ (Accessed: 9 November 2026).
NISR (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda) (2025) EICV7 Main Indicators Report 2023/24. Kigali: NISR. Available at: https://statistics.gov.rw/statistical-publications/poverty-and-social-protection/eicv7-main-indicators-report-202324 (Accessed: 9 November 2026).
Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
WAM (Emirates News Agency) (2025) UAE’s GDP reached AED1,776 billion in 2024 with 4% growth, 15 June. Available at: https://www.wam.ae/en/article/15mbimn-uae%E2%80%99s-gdp-reached-aed1776-billion-2024-with (Accessed: 9 November 2026).
World Bank (2026) Rwanda: overview. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/ext/en/country/rwanda (Accessed: 9 November 2026).